Egyptians Crisis: Democratic attitude toward a disfavoured government

When early in July, Egyptian Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi issued an ultimatum to President Mohamed Morsi to resolve ongoing protests within 48 hours or face military intervention, I was dumbfounded. An ultimatum of the kind was in essence the announcement of a coup, a courtesy notice to Morsi to start packing. Before Morsi was elected in June last year, the military had been virtually in power throughout the history of modern Egypt. And they flexed every muscle they could to maintain that power after the ouster of strongman Hosni Mubarak. When the militarywere pressured to give up power, they insisted on sharing it. And so, from day one, they had an uneasy relationship with Morsi’s government. But what propelled Egypt to the horrifying bloodshed that is almost certain to metamorphose into a civil war is much more than the ambitions of the spoiled generals. It is primarily the gulf between the sensibility of Egypt’s political class and that of the populace. One is leery of Islamists in power and the other is unperturbed by it. And so when the Muslim Brotherhood won the presidential election and the majority in the parliament, there was considerable unease. Along with the military, the judiciary, businesses, intellectuals and the rest of the secular society were all alarmed. It was certainly understandable. The appropriate democratic attitude toward a disfavoured government is to work to vote it out in the next election. Alas, Muslim regimes have tended to behave like communist parties. Once they attain power, they banish the alternatives. Iran, for instance, practises a “democracy” in which a group of clerics (the Guidance Council) decides who is eligible to run for office. And, their litmus test is fidelity to Islamist theocracy.Therefore, secular candidates have no chance to even make their case to the electorate. It is concern for such a development thatdroveEgypt’s political class — wittingly or unwittingly — to undermine the Morsi administration. In the process, they have also scuttled Egypt’s democracy in its embryonic stage. Had Morsi been politically savvy, he could have successfully calmed the jittery nerves. But the fellow was politically incompetent and ill advised. His Islamist ideology gave him a very narrow vision of the governance needs of his country. And that fuelled resistance to his administration and ultimately caused his downfall. But, then, Morsi wasn’t given much of a chance. The first major blow to his governance came when the judiciary dissolved the parliament. It is quite common in emerging democracies for courts to nullify individuals’ elections. But to dissolve a newly elected parliament — the definitive institution of democracy — was quite impetuous. Even more impetuous was Morsi’s reaction: He declared himself above the authority of the judiciary. In the absence of a parliament, he, in effect, gave himself the power to issue decrees without legislative or judicial checks. He had become a pharaoh, an Islamist pharaoh. How could he not foresee the danger?In all likelihood, the reason is ineptitude and naiveté. Morsi must have presumed that he had co-opted the military by appointing General Sisi the defence minister. He was quite wrong. It was Sisi who gave Morsi the 48-hour ultimatum and shoved him into custody. There is also the explanation that Morsi was simply fatalistic. He was determined to do what he felt he had to do regardless of the consequence. As recounted to the New York Times, Morsi said of his political fate, “The peak will be when you see my blood flowing on the floor.” That has not happened yet. Rather it is the blood of more than1,000 of his supporters that is flowing. And in all likelihood the blood of tens of thousands more Egyptians will follow. When Morsi declared himself above the judiciary, he set off a wave of protests that never waivered. It was the same kind of protests that forced out Mubarak and gave rise to the elections that brought Morsi to power. Yet, he remained resolute. Meanwhile, Egypt’s economy was spiralling downward. The business class contributed to the slide by pulling their investment out of Egypt or choosing not to invest. It was partly the normal flight of capital from places of unease to more secure shores. But there may also have been an element of sabotage. Not long after Morsi’s ouster, Egypt’s capital market surged.

Of course, the protesters were ecstatic that Morsi was out. But it had to be gross naivete for anyone to think that the Muslim Brotherhood would acquiesce.Algeria went through a prolonged period of terrorist carnage after the military there similarly ousted an Islamist government. And therein lies the folly of the Egyptian military’s precipitous action. Among physicians, the guiding principle is that if you cannot help, at least do no harm. It is a dictum that the military in developing countries should heed. In most cases, military intervention in political problems only exacerbates the problems. In the case of Egypt, the military have now so inflamed the situation that anything short of a civil war will be considered fortunate. Before the military’s intervention, there were prospective political solutions to the political muddle. A new parliamentary election could have been conducted expeditiously to meet the judiciary’s conditions. Egypt’s secular parties would have then been better prepared to contest the seats. The result still could have been a parliament that is dominated by Islamists. In that case, the secular society would use the political process, including protests, to forestall any attempt to institutionalise theocratic rule. The outcome couldn’t have been any worse than what the military have plunged the country into. The generals are the only beneficiaries of the current upheaval, at least in the short term. They have returned to power through the back door.And they have already appointedthemselves provincial governors. Meanwhile, Mubarak has been freed and the government is contemplating proscribing the Muslim Brotherhood. That would deny them any political options and send them underground. And Egypt would be set for a long and explosive reign of terror — from the generals and the Brotherhood.Ordinary Egyptians, Christians in particular, will bear the brunt. The apocalyptic is so probable.